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HIV-SPECIFIC KNOWING TRANSMISSION
STATUTES: A PROPOSAL TO HELP FIGHT
AN EPIDEMIC
INTRODUCTION
Since the outbreak of the HIV-AIDS1 epidemic, the legal
community has sought ways of balancing the civil liberties of
HIV-positive individuals with public health policies designed to
protect society from the spread of the deadly virus. One of the
main tenets of this debate is how to prosecute individuals who
knowingly transmit the HIV virus. Originally prosecutors sought
to charge individuals who knowingly transmitted the HIV virus
to others under traditional criminal statutes. 2 It quickly became
apparent, however, that the unique nature of these cases made
such prosecutions difficult.
In response to the inherent difficulties in prosecuting knowing
transmission cases under traditional criminal laws and the
media attention that those cases attract, 3 state legislatures
1 See REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMM'N ON THE HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY
VIRUS EPIDEMIC 8, 15 (1988); U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., SURGEON
GENERAL'S REPORT ON ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME 11-12, 20 (1986),
reprinted in Colloquy, Criminalization of an Epidemic: HIV-AIDS and Criminal Exposure,
46 ARK. L. REV. 921, 922 (1994). HIV-AIDS is the abbreviation for Human
Immunodeficiency Virus - Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome. Id. Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) is a potentially fatal disease that begins with the
transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV). Id. Infection with the HIV virus
begins with gradual erosion of the infected individual's immune system. Id. Infected
individuals may remain in an asymptomatic state for as long as nine years or longer. Id.
Once HIV develops into full-blown AIDS, those individuals may live for several years. Id.
Ultimately, those infected will not die from the HIV-AIDS virus, but from infection they
contract as a result of their suppressed immune system. Id.
2 See Erin M. O'Toole, HIV-Specific Crime Legislation: Targeting an Epidemic for
Criminal Prosecution, 10 J.L. & HEALTH 183, 186 (1995/1996) (noting that "[tihe available
offenses for prosecution [in knowing transmission cases] included homicide, attempted
homicide, rape, criminal assault, reckless endangering, prostitution, and sexually
transmitted disease statutes").
3 See, e.g., Margaret Brazier, At Large With A Lethal Weapon; Should the willful
transmission of AIDS be made a crime?, THE GUARDIAN, June 24, 1992, at F19 (describing
local case where HIV-positive man, whom the author describes as "a murderer in
disguise," knowingly transmitted virus through sexual intercourse to at least four
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throughout the nation have responded by enacting HIV-specific
criminal legislation for cases involving the knowing transmission
of the virus.4 These statutes were drafted to give "clear notice of
socially unacceptable standards of behavior" and provide a means
for punishment of those who knowingly transmit the HIV-AIDS
virus. 5 These statutes have been attacked on two fronts:
constitutional grounds6 and public policy grounds. 7 This Note
women); Lawrence 0. Gostin, Criminal Law Won't Stop AIDS, L.A. TIMES, July 6, 1987,
Part II, at 5 (describing case where defendant was charged with attempted murder for
selling his HIV-infected blood to area blood bank); Terry Pristin, Key Witness Refuses to
Testify in AIDS Murder Attempt Trial, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 2, 1987, at M3 (describing
charges of attempted murder against defendant for knowingly attempting to transmit
HIV to another man through unprotected sex); Mack Reed, Area Man Is Accused of
Passing AIDS Virus, L.A- TIMES, Jan. 12, 1991, at B1 (reporting that Los Angeles man
was prosecuted for having sex with woman on number of occasions without disclosing his
HIV-positive status to her, resulting in infection of both her and child); Lynne Robertson,
Fiscal to Study Claim Over HIV Infection; Former Girlfriend Accused, THE HERALD, Feb.
10, 1998, at 1 (describing case where woman knowingly infected her former boyfriend
with HIV virus); Man Gets 9-Year Prison Term for Exposing Girl to HIV, Drugs, CHI.
TRIB., Dec. 1, 1992, at M5 (reporting 65 month prison sentence handed down to HIV-
positive individual for attempted murder after he knowingly exposed HIV virus to
seventeen-year-old girl through sexual intercourse).
4 See Lynda Richardson, Wave of Laws Aimed at People With HIV, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
25, 1998, at Al (noting that one-third of those statutes have been enacted in last three
years alone). See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-123(b) (Michie Supp. 1993) (stating that
"[a] person commits the offense of exposing another to human immunodeficiency virus if
the person.., exposes another.., without first having informed the other person of the
presence of the human immunodeficiency virus"); FLA. STAT. § 384.24 (1998) (prohibiting
sexual intercourse by HIV-positive individuals, unless expressly consented to by partner);
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-60(c) (Michie Supp. 1992) (criminalizing knowing engagement of
behavior likely to transmit HIV without disclosure); IDAHO CODE § 39-608 (Supp. 1992)
(criminalizing intentional "[t]ransfer of bodily fluid which may contain the HIV virus");
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38 paragraph 12-16.2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992) (making criminal
transmission of H1V class 2 felony); IOWA CODE § 709C1 (1999) (criminalizing knowing
transmission of HIV); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 529.090 (Baldwin 1991) (providing separate
charge for prostitutes who knowingly transmit HV); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43.5 (West
Supp. 1993) (criminalizing intentional exposure of HIV to another without consent); MD.
HEALTH GEN. CODE ANN. § 18-601.1 (1990) (providing for misdemeanor offense in cases
where "who has the human immunodeficiency virus.., knowingly transfer[s] or
attempt[s] to transfer the human immunodeficiency virus to another individual"); MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 333.5210 (1992) (stating that individual who knows they are HIV-positive
and performs "sexual penetration" without other party's consent is guilty of felony); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 191.677 (Vernon Supp. 1993) (criminalizing reckless conduct exposing
another to risk of infection); NEV. REV. STAT. § 441A.300 (Michie 1991) (criminalizing
knowing or willful conduct intended or likely to transmit HIV); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-
20-17 (1999) (providing that person who willfully transfers HIV-infected body fluid to
another is guilty of class A felony); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1192.1 (West Supp. 1993)
(criminalizing "[k]nowingly engaging in conduct reasonably likely to transfer HIV virus");
PA. C. S. § 2701 (1999) (criminalizing intentional or knowing conduct by prison inmates
which put another in contact with HIV-infected fluids); S. C. CODE ANN. § 44-29-145
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992) (criminalizing knowing transmission of HIV).
5 See REPORT, supra note 1, at 130 (reporting findings that states should enact HIV-
specific knowing transmission statutes).
6 See, e.g., People v. Jensen, 231 Mich. App. 439, 443 (1998) (challenging Michigan's
knowing transmission statute because it "(1) includes both consensual and nonconsensual
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will address the constitutional challenges to knowing
transmission statutes. The New York State Legislature has
recently proposed such legislation,8 and these proposals have
attracted much attention. When properly drafted, these statutes
ensure that those who knowingly transmit the HIV virus are
punished and provide the deterrent effect necessary to prevent
knowing transmission cases.
Part I of this Note discusses the case of Nushawn Williams; a
resident of rural Chautauqua County in upstate New York who
was responsible for one of the worst HIV-AIDS epidemics to hit a
single community. Part II addresses the problems faced by
prosecutors attempting to fit knowing transmission cases under
traditional laws. Part III discusses knowing transmission
statutes that specifically target the knowing transmission of the
HIV-AIDS virus, with particular emphasis on a proposal
acts and (2) fails to require an intent to cause harm"); People v. Russell, 158 Ill. 2d 23, 25
(1994) (challenging Illinois' knowing transmission statute as "so vague as to deny the
defendants due process of law").
7 See Lawrence 0. Gostin, The Politics of AIDS: Compulsory State Powers, Public
Health, and Civil Liberties, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1017, 1041-42 (1989) (arguing that any rush
to institute knowing transmission statutes merely ignores "the failure of previous
attempts to control venereal disease"); Eric L. Schulman, Sleeping With the Enemy:
Combating the Sexual Spread of HIV-AIDS Through a Heightened Legal Duty, 29 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 957, 977 (1996) (indicating that knowing transmission statutes do not
prevent spread of HIV because majority of people do not know they have HIV); see also
Deborah Pinkney, AIDS Becomes Issue for Courts; HIV-Related Cases on the Rise, CHI.
SUN-TIMES, Dec. 7, 1992, at 16 (arguing that criminalization will only perpetuate
prejudices against HIV-positive individuals).
8 See S.B. 3017, 222nd Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. (N.Y. 1999); AB. 5501, 222nd Leg., 1st
Spec. Sess. (N.Y. 1999). The proposals before the New York State Senate and Assembly,
referred to the Codes Committees, establishes the crime of reckless endangerment of the
public health in the first and second degree:
Section 120.26: Reckless Endangerment Of The Public Health In The First Degree. A
person is guilty of reckless endangerment of the public health in the first degree
when he or she is aware that he or she has tested positively for HIV/AIDS and then
recklessly engages in conduct which results in the transmission of HIV/AIDS to
another person who was unaware of such condition. A woman who transmits the
HIV/AIDS virus to her child as a result of giving birth to that child shall not be
prosecuted under this section. ... Reckless endangerment of the public health in the
first degree is a class B felony.
Id.
Section 120.27: Reckless Endangerment Of The Public Health In The Second Degree.
A person is guilty of reckless endangerment of the public health in the second degree
when he or she is aware that he or she has tested positively for HIV/AIDS and then
recklessly engages in conduct which creates a substantial risk of transmission of
HIV/AIDS to another person who was unaware of such condition. A woman who
transmits the HIV/AIDS virus to her child as a result of giving birth shall not be
prosecuted under this section .... Reckless endangerment of the public health in the
second degree is a class C felony.
1999]
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currently before the New York State Legislature. Part IV
examines the constitutional challenges that defendants have
brought against knowing transmission statutes. Part V offers a
recommendation for the enactment of a narrowly worded HIV-
specific knowing transmission statute in New York. This Note
posits that a carefully drafted knowing transmission statute
could strike the delicate balance between punishing those who
commit such reprehensible acts, while protecting the civil
liberties of innocent HIV-positive individuals.
I. THE NUSHAWN WILLIAMS CASE
In October of 1997, the rural community of Chautauqua
County in upstate New York became the center of one of the
worst outbreaks of HIV-AIDS to hit this country since its
inception. 9  Nushawn Williams was at the heart of this
controversy because, despite knowing of his HIV-positive status,
he engaged in unprotected sex with numerous women in the
community. 10 In May of 1998, a Chautauqua County grand jury
indicted Williams on two counts of second-degree statutory
rape. 11 In August of 1998, Williams was also indicted by a Bronx
County grand jury on two felony charges: Reckless
Endangerment in the First Degree and Attempted Assault in the
9 See Amy M. Decker, Criminalizing the Intentional or Reckless Exposure to HIV. A
Wake-Up Call to Kansas, 46 KAN. L. REV. 333, 333 (1998) (describing Nushawn Williams
actions and his effect on surrounding community); Richard N. Gottfried, Symposium on
Health Care Policy: What Lessons Have We Learned from the AIDS Pandemic: Article:
Lessons from Chautauqua County, 61 ALB. L. REV. 1079, 1082 (1998) (describing Williams
actions as "horrifying"); see also Richard Perez-Pena, Two Births Lengthen List In One-
Man H.I.V. Spree, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1998, at B5 (describing Williams's case as "one of
the most notorious outbreaks of H.I.V ... ").
10 See Trent T. Gegax, The AIDS Predator, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 10, 1997, at 53 (stating
that Nushawn Williams may have exposed as many as 100 people, if not more); Mark
Hansen, Can the Law Stop AIDS?, ABA JOURNAL, May 1998, at 26 (noting that at least
16 of those women in both Chautauqua County and New York City are now known to
have tested positive for HIV); Perez-Pena, supra note 9, at B5 (noting that investigators
have identified 48 sexual partners of Nushawn Williams in Chautauqua County, and that
Williams stated he had sex with 50 to 75 other women in New York City); Richardson,
supra note 4, at Al (indicating that as a result of Nushawn Williams infecting over dozen
young women, 29 states responded by criminalizing knowing transmission of HIV);
Jennifer Tanaka & Gregory Reals, The Victims' Stories, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 10, 1997, at 55
(noting that according to public health officials estimate that Mr. Williams had sex with
as many as 43 women in Chautauqua County, and at least 28 more in New York City).
11 See Sheila McCarthy, HIV-Infected Williams Indicted on Two Counts of Statutory
Rape, THE BUFFALO NEWS, May 21, 1998, at 5B (noting that Chautauqua County District
Attorney's Office plans to coordinate prosecution of Williams with Bronx County District
Attorney's Office).
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Second Degree. 12
In February of 1999, Williams pleaded guilty in Bronx County
to reckless endangerment for having exposed a woman to the
HIV virus. 13 A week after this agreement, Williams pled guilty in
Chautauqua County to two counts of rape in the second degree
and reckless endangerment in the first degree.14 On April 5,
1999, Williams was sentenced in Chautauqua County Court to 4
to 12 years in prison. 15 Ten days later, on April 15, 1999,
Williams was sentenced in Bronx County Supreme Court to 6
years imprisonment. 16 Pursuant to the plea agreements Williams
will serve his sentences concurrently. 17
The prosecutor in Williams' case would have faced unique
difficulties had they attempted to try the case under the rubric of
traditional criminal laws.' 8  While prosecuting knowing
transmission cases under traditional criminal laws is difficult,
cases have been successfully tried under traditional penal
statutes.19 Most of these cases have been prosecuted as
12 See Mark Hamblett, HIV Carrier Indicted for Unprotected Sex" Bronx DA Charges
Nushawn Williams with Reckless Endangerment, Assault, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 20, 1998, at 1
(noting importance of Williams case, Anthony Girese, counsel to Bronx District Attorney
Robert Johnson, stated "[t]here have been a few needle or bite cases but this appears to be
the first reckless endangerment prosecution [for sexual transmission]").
13 See Amy Waldman, Guilty Plea in an H.I.V Exposure Case, N.Y. TIMES, Feb, 19,
1999, at B3 (noting that prosecutors are also weighing whether to charge Williams "with
assault in instances in which the authorities believe he knowingly infected women with
H.I.V....."); Today's News, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 19, 1999, at 1 (stating that Williams, first
person indicted in New York for knowingly transmitting HIV to sex partner, pled guilty to
first degree reckless endangerment).
14 See Man Pleads Guilty in Rape Cases And Exposing Woman to H.I.V., N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 27, 1999, at B6 (stating that "[t]he deal was reached months ago between Mr.
Williams, Chautauqua County and Bronx County").
15 See Today's News, N.Y.L.J., April 6, 1999, at 1 (stating that sentencing was result
of an earlier plea agreement to charges of second-degree rape and reckless
endangerment); Richard Perez-Pena, Drifter Gets 4 to 12 Years in HIV Case, N.Y. TIMES,
April 6, 1999, at B1 (noting that only two victims were willing to testify).
16 See Ralph R. Ortega & Raphael Sugarman, HIV-Infected Man Gets 6-Year Term,
N.Y. DAILY NEWS, April 16, 1999, at 31 (noting that investigators charged that Williams
traded drugs for sex with young women).
17 See Man Pleads Guilty, supra note 14, at B6. In Chautauqua County, Williams
could have received 2 to 6 years in prison for each rape count, and 4 to 12 years on the
charge of reckless endangerment. Id. In Bronx County, Williams was sentenced to the
maximum of a possible 2 to 6 years. See Waldman, supra note 13, at B3; Today's News,
supra note 13, at 1.
18 See Jody B. Gabel, Liability For "Knowing" Transmission Of HIV The Evolution Of
A Duty To Disclose, 21 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 981, 994 (1994) (discussing early reports in
newspapers of perception that prosecutors faced near impossibility in getting conviction in
a knowing transmission case).
19 See id. In 1990, there were fifty-four HIV-related criminal prosecutions in the
United States that resulted in convictions for either assault or attempted murder. Id.;
1999]
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attempted murders or assaults. 20 Oftentimes, the particular facts
of these cases will hinder the prosecution's ability to prove such
essential elements as intent 21 and causation. 22
Due to the unique nature of the disease proving intent often
becomes problematic when attempting to fit knowing
transmission cases under traditional criminal law statutes.
Prosecuting knowing transmission cases often hinges on the
subtle differences between intention and indifference. 23 In cases
where the prosecution has been successful, 24 defendants have
stated their intentions to infect the victims. 25 Many times,
citing Lawrence 0. Gostin, The AIDS Litigation Project, A National Review of Court and
Human Rights Commission Decisions, Part I: The Social Impact of AIDS, 263 J. AM. MED.
Assoc. 1961 (1990). Whereas just a few years earlier, such cases were virtually unheard
of. Id. at 1961; see also Rorie Sherman, Criminal Prosecutions On AIDS Growing, NAT'L
L.J., Oct. 14, 1991, at 3. The number of knowing transmission cases had risen to 840 in
1991. Id.
20 See J. Kelly Strader, Criminalization As A Response To A Public Health Crisis, 27
J. MARSHALL L. REV. 435, 437 (1994). Such prosecutions are viable "in cases where there
is sufficient evidence for a jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
intended to transmit the virus." Id. However, due to the unique nature of the HIV-AIDS
virus, there has never been a homicide prosecution in the United States for intentionally
or recklessly exposing another to HIV. Id. See also Decker, supra note 9, at 340. The
nature of the disease will often times lead to the death of the defendant before the victim,
therefore, a homicide prosecution is not possible because the victim will not have died. Id.
Gostin, supra note 7, at 1042 n.129. There are inherent difficulties in attempting to try a
knowing transmission case as homicide or manslaughter because the victim must have
already died. Id. MODEL PENAL CODE §210.1 (1985). The Model Penal Code states that an
individual must cause the death of another person in a criminal homicide prosecution. Id.
21 See MODEL PENAL CODE §2.02 (Official Draft 1962). The Model Penal Code states
the minimum requirements of culpability as follows: "[A] person is not guilty of an offense
unless he acted purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently, as the law may require,
with respect to each material element of the offense." Id.
22 See MODEL PENAL CODE §2.03 (Official Draft 1962). The Model Penal Code requires
that a causal relationship between conduct and the result exist, stating: "Conduct is the
cause of a result when: (a) it is an antecedent but for which the result in question would
not have occurred; and (b) the relationship between the conduct and result satisfies any
additional causal requirements imposed by the Code or by the law defining the offense."
Id.
23 See, e.g., Smallwood v. State, 680 A.2d 512, 517 (Md. 1996) (stating that court, in
reversing the defendant's convictions for attempted murder and assault with intent to
murder, had "no trouble concluding that [the defendant] intentionally exposed his victims
to the risk of HIV-infection. The problem ... is whether knowingly exposing someone to a
risk of HIV-infection is by itself sufficient to infer that [the defendant] possessed an intent
to kill."); see also Jenifer Grishkin, Knowingly Exposing Another to HIV, 106 YALE L.J.
1617, 1618 (1997) (noting that Court of Appeals in Maryland became first court to address
"whether knowingly exposing someone to a risk of HIV-infection is by itself sufficient to
infer.., an intent to kill").
24 See, e.g., State v. Haines, 545 N.E.2d 834, 835 (Ind. Ct. App.2d 1989) (reinstating
jury's guilty verdict for attempted murder where HIV-positive defendant intended to
transmit disease to others); Brock v. State, 555 So. 2d 285, 289 (Ala. Crim. App.1989)
(holding HIV-positive defendant guilty of third-degree assault after he bit corrections
officer).
25 See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 846 F.2d 1163, 1165 (8th Cir. 1988) (during
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however, these cases, particularly those involving sexual
intercourse, do not have such a clear manifestation of intent.26
Where intent must be inferred based on the defendant's actions
alone, 27 courts have been reluctant to find criminal liability.28
Proving causation also becomes problematic when attempting
to fit knowing transmission cases under traditional criminal law
statutes. 29 The HIV virus does not actually kill the individual;
instead, an infection affects the victim's suppressed immune
system and death may result after a period of time. 30 Prosecutors
struggle, defendant threatened to kill guards and later reiterated his hopes that they get
his disease); Scroggins v. State, 401 S.E.2d 13, 15 (Ga. App. 1991) (concluding that
defendant had requisite intent, when, after victim was bit and asked whether defendant
had AIDS, defendant "just looked at him and laughed"); State v. Haines, 545 N.E.2d 834,
835 (Ind. Ct. App.2d 1989) (during altercation, defendant shouted that he wanted to "give
it [HIV-AIDS] to him [the victim]"); State v. Caine, 652 So.2d 611, 613 (La. App. 1995)
(upholding conviction of defendant who jabbed used syringe into victim's arm and shouted
"I'll give you AIDS"); State v. Smith, 621 A.2d 493, 495 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993)
(upholding defendant's conviction where he threatened to kill police officer by biting and
spitting at him); State v. Hinkhouse, 912 P.2d 921, 924 (Or. Ct. App. 1996) (upholding
defendant's conviction where he stated that "if he were [HIVI-positive, he would spread
the disease to other people."); Weeks v. State, 834 S.W.2d 559, 561 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992)
(during incident, defendant stated that he was "going to take somebody with him when he
went"); State v. Stark, 832 P.2d 109, 112 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (convicting defendant
based on his statements that, "I don't care. If I'm going to die, everybody's going to die.").
26 See Gabel, supra note 18, at 1004 (noting that "charges of attempted murder based
on the knowing transmission of HIV through sexual intercourse infrequently include
manifestations of intent through murderous threats").
27 See, e.g., Smallwood v. State, 680 A.2d 512, 514 (Md. 1996) (rejecting prosecution's
argument that facts of case were sufficient to infer intent to kill where HIV-positive
individual raped woman).
28 See id. at 513 (reversing defendant's conviction of attempted murder and assault
with intent to murder by exposing victims to HIV).
29 See Gabel, supra note 18, at 984 (describing how protracted period of time in which
HIV-positive individual remains symptom-free provides unique problems from standpoint
of prosecutor attempting to prove that particular defendant was, in fact, one who
transmitted disease to victim); see also Gina Kolata, How AIDS Smolders: Immune
System Studies Follow the Tracks of H.I.V, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1992, at Cl (describing
how the HIV virus can remain in one's system symptom-free for periods of up to ten
years).
30 See, e.g., GERALD J. STINE, ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME:
BIOLOGICAL, MEDICAL, SOCIAL, AND LEGAL ISSUES 35 (1993) (stating that AIDS is not
what ultimately kills HIV-positive individual, but opportunistic infections); Lori A. David,
The Rights and Responsibilities of People With HIV or AIDS: The Legal Ramifications in
Criminal Law of Knowingly Transmitting AIDS, 19 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 259, 261 (1995)
(noting that "the virus' destruction of the immune system does not itself lead to death, the
infection frequently leads to infections and malignancies" which are what ultimately kills
an HIV-positive individual); Decker, supra note 9, at 336 (noting that AIDS patients are
not killed by HIV, but by subsequent infections due to patient's suppressed immune
system); Rebecca Ruby, Apprehending The Weapon Within: The Case For Criminalizing
The Intentional Transmission Of HIV, 36 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 313, 327 (1999) (noting that
in many cases victim will die before defendant); Cathleen J. Schaffner, Inferring The
Intent Of An AIDS Rapist: Smallwood v. State, 14 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 375, 376 (1997)
(noting that HIV leaves immune system severely weakened and body unprotected against
"opportunistic infections").
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must overcome the difficulty of proving that the defendant was
the one who in fact transmitted the virus to the victim.31 Proving
that the defendant actually infected the victim can be difficult
because it may take months or years for a victim to learn that he
or she has been infected.
Individuals pose a danger to society by knowingly transmitting
the HIV virus and should be brought to justice. Despite
numerous well-publicized cases to the contrary, 32 instances
involving the knowing transmission of HIV are rare.33
Legislatures and courts, however, must ensure that remedies
which address those cases involving the knowing transmission of
HIV, punish those who are in fact culpable. 34
II. KNOWING TRANSMISSION PROSECUTIONS UNDER TRADITIONAL
CRIMINAL LAWS
A. Problems in Proving "Intent"
Since the inception of the HIV virus, state courts have faced
the challenge of attempting to fit knowing transmission cases
under traditional criminal laws. An important difficulty a
prosecutor faces is attempting to prove that the defendant
31 See Strader, supra note 20, at 437 (discussing difficulties prosecutors may face in
proving causation in defendant's murder trial for knowingly transmitting HIV); see
generally Grishkin, supra note 23, at 1621 (noting that "year and a day" rule may
preclude prosecution in some knowing transmission cases); Kimberly A- Harris, Death at
First Bite: A Mens Rea Approach in Determining Criminal Liability for Intentional HIV
Transmission, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 237, 240-41 (1993) (claiming that the indicia of
transmission does not arise some time after transmission); Jacob A. Heth, Dangerous
Liaisons: Criminalizing Conduct Related to HIV Transmission, 29 WILLAMETE L. REV.
843, 855 (1993) (discussing problems in proving causation).
32 See, e.g., Brazier, supra note 3, at F19 (describing case of local man who knowingly
transmitted HIV to a woman); Gostin, supra note 3, at Part II, 5; Pristin, supra note 3, at
M3 (describing case of HIV-infected male selling contaminated blood to blood bank); Reed,
supra note 3, at BI (reporting about case of HIV-infected male knowingly transmitting
the virus to woman and child); Robertson, supra note 3, at 1 describing case of woman
knowingly infecting her former boyfriend with HIV virus); Man Gets 9-Year Prison Term,
supra note 3, at M5.
33 See Gabel, supra note 18, at 982 n.11 (noting that "[o]f the estimated one million
individuals infected with HIV, the number of cases involving intentional or knowing
attempts to transmit HIV constitute a minute portion of this population").
34 See generally David Robinson, Jr., AIDS and the Criminal Law: Traditional
Approaches and a New Statutory Proposal, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 91, 105 (1985) (noting
importance of criminal punishment for those who knowingly transmit HIV); Stefanie S.
Wepner, The Death Penalty: A Solution to the Problem of Intentional AIDS Transmission
Through Rape, 26 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 941, 971-73 (1993) (arguing death penalty in
certain knowing transmission cases).
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intended to transmit the HIV virus to the victim. Proving intent
is problematic in all but a very few cases where the defendant
may overtly state his or her intention to transmit the virus.35
This difficulty was clearly illustrated in the Maryland Court of
Appeals decision in Smallwood v. State.36 In overturning three
attempted murder convictions of defendant Dwight Ralph
Smallwood, 37 the court acknowledged the inherent problems in
trying knowing transmission cases under traditional criminal
laws. 38
The Maryland Court of Appeals concluded that circumstantial
evidence of intent to expose others to the risk of HIV-infection
was not enough to infer an "intent to kill."39 The court addressed
the unique characteristics of the HIV-AIDS virus in considering
the amount of risk to which victims were exposed. 40 The court
35 See R. Brian Leech, Criminalizing Sexual Transmission of HIV: Oklahoma's
Intentional Transmission Statute: Unconstitutional or Merely Unenforceable?, 46 OKLA. L.
REV. 687, 695 (1993) (noting difficulty prosecutors face in proving intention); Ruby, supra
note 30, at 326 (noting difficulty prosecutors face in proving intent, "aside from the most
extreme cases where there is an overt statement or demonstration of intent by the
defendant").
36 680 A.2d 512 (Md. 1996). Smallwood was diagnosed and informed as having the
HIV virus in 1991. Id. at 513. A social worker had warned him that he needed to practice
safe sex because he posed a risk of transmitting the virus to a sexual partner. Id. Two
years later, Smallwood and an accomplice were arrested for forcibly raping three female
victims on three separate occasions in September of 1993. Id. Smallwood was convicted of
attempted second-degree murder for each of his victims. Id. at 513-14. Smallwood argued
that the trial court lacked sufficient evidence to conclude that he intended to kill his three
victims. Id. Smallwood challenged that simply because "he engaged in unprotected sexual
intercourse, even though he knew he carried HIV, [was] insufficient to infer an intent to
kill." Id. The State argued that the factual record was sufficient to infer an intent to kill,
likening "Smallwood's HIV-positive status to a deadly weapon and [argued] that engaging
in unprotected sex when one is knowingly infected with HIV is equivalent to firing a
loaded firearm at that person." Id. The State cited cases from other jurisdictions that they
argued justified inferring an intent to kill in knowing transmission cases. Id. at 516-17.
37 See id. at 518. (concluding "that Smallwood's convictions for attempted murder and
assault with intent to murder must be reversed").
38 See id. at 517 n.4. (stating "[w]e have no trouble concluding that Smallwood
intentionally exposed his victims to the risk of HIV-infection. The problem ... is whether
knowingly exposing someone to a risk of HIV-infection is... sufficient to infer that
Smallwood possessed an intent to kill").
39 See id. at 513. "In this case, we examine the use of circumstantial evidence to infer
that a defendant possessed the intent to kill needed for conviction of attempted murder or
assault with intent to murder. We conclude that such an inference is not supportable
under the facts of this case." Id.
40 See id. at 516.
Before an intent to kill may be inferred based solely upon the defendant's exposure of
a victim to a risk of death, it must be shown that the victim's death would have been
a natural and probable result of the defendant's conduct.... Death by AIDS is clearly
one natural possible consequence of exposing someone to a risk of HIV infection, even
on a single occasion. It is less clear that death by AIDS from that single exposure is a
sufficiently probable result to provide the sole support for an inference that the
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ultimately held that the risk of exposure was not sufficient to
infer the defendant's intent to kill the victim. 4 1
Legal analysts described the decision as an important ruling in
AIDS law. 42 The decision countered the prevailing trend of
finding defendants guilty in knowing transmission cases tried
under traditional criminal laws.43 The decision was considered
controversial 44 and sparked considerable debate over the court's
rationale. 45
Other state jurisdictions have supported prosecutions where
additional evidence was present, such as statements relevant to
the intent of the defendant. 46 Such additional evidence, however,
is often not available. The Smallwood case was followed by the
passage of many HIV-specific criminal statutes throughout the
country 47
person causing the exposure intended to kill the person who was exposed.
Id.
41 See id. (holding that "we find no additional evidence from which to infer an intent
to kill").
42 See Amy Argetsinger, Maryland's Top Court Says HIV Not Enough To Convict
Rapist of Attempted Murder, WASH. POST, Aug. 2, 1996, at Al. Arthur Leonard, a
professor at New York Law School, stated that 'This will be an important decision for
AIDS law." Id. at Al. Georgetown Law Professor Lawrence 0. Gostin summarized the
ruling as supportive of equal treatment of HIV-positive criminals. Id. at Al.
43 See id. At the time of the Smallwood decision, at least one dozen cases were upheld
by appeals courts in the country, where HIV-positive individuals had been found guilty of
attempted murder for the potential of exposing others to the virus. Id.
44 See, e.g., Schaffner, supra note 30, at 400 (stating that "[h]olding Smallwood
accountable for his actions would have meant that AIDS rapists who are aware of their
HIV-positive status and understand that rape can lead to transmission of the virus to
their victims will be convicted of attempted murder...").
45 See Argetsinger, supra note 42, at Al. Proponents of the Smallwood decision, such
as Catherine Hanssens, a director with the gay rights Lambda Legal Defense and
Education Fund, "argued that as awful as the rapes were, they should not be judged
differently because of the accused's health. Id. 'HIV alone is not evidence of criminal
intent.... It's not a sufficient basis to treat two identically horrible crimes differently
under the law."' Id. While opponents, such as the Maryland State Attorney General J.
Joseph Curran Jr., whose office prosecuted the case, criticized the ruling as letting a
guilty man go free on a technicality. Id. See also Grishkin, supra note 23, at 1618. "The
Smallwood decision has sparked an intense debate. Proponents... have applauded it as
'standing for the proposition that persons with AIDS should be treated like everyone else
in the criminal justice system ... [while opponents] accuse the Smallwood court of
exalting legal technicalities over justice... "Id.
46 See, e.g., State v. Haines, 545 N.E.2d 834, 838 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that it
was only necessary for state to show that defendant did all he believed necessary to bring
about intended result); State v. Smith, 621 A.2d 493, 511 (N.J. Supr. Ct. App. Div. 1993)
(holding attempted murder conviction appropriate when defendant believes he can cause
death by biting his victim).
47 See Richardson, supra note 4, at Al (noting recent explosion of passage of HIV-
specific knowing transmission statutes).
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B. Problems in Proving Causation
The element of causation has proven to be another difficult
challenge for prosecutors trying to pursue knowing transmission
cases under traditional criminal laws.48 In knowing transmission
cases the element of causation is often tied to the element of
intent.49 Prosecutors must prove that the victim's exposure to the
HIV virus resulted from actions of the defendantSO and not a
third party.51
In order to establish causation the likelihood of infection
becomes a probative issue in knowing transmission prosecutions.
Early attempts to prosecute knowing transmission cases were
often met with little success because of the lack of medical
evidence regarding possible ways of transmitting the virus. 52
Despite the heavy burden a prosecutor faces in proving intent
and causation, they are often benefited by the fact that the
impossibility of transmission is not a defense to an "attempt"
48 See Heather J. Blum, Tort Liability as the Result of the Transmission of HJV
Through Artificial Insemination by Donor, 4 ALB. IJ. SCI. & TECH. 333, 349 (1994)
(noting difficulties in proving causation in knowing transmission cases because "HIV may
be transmitted in a number of ways"); Colloquy, supra note 1, at 928 (noting "[t]he
government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's actions caused
the death" and "[i]f the victim has had multiple sexual partners, the government is going
to have a difficult time meeting its burden of proof'); Decker, supra note 9, at 360 (noting
inherent difficulties proving causation in knowing transmission cases under traditional
criminal statutes); Strader, supra note 20, at 437 (stating "the government may have
difficulty proving causation, i.e., that the victim's only exposure to HIV resulted from the
defendant's acts").
49 PAUL DEROHANNESIAN II, SEXUAL ASSAULT TRIALS: VOLUME I 527 (Lexis Law
Publishing 1998)(stating that "[tihe issue of causation is tied to the element of
intent...").
50 See Strader, supra note 20, at 437 (discussing difficulties prosecutors may face in
proving causation). See generally Grishkin, supra note 23, at 1621 (noting particular
difficulties prosecution may face in some knowing transmission cases); Harris, supra note
31, at 240-41 (discussing difficulties prosecuting knowing transmission cases with respect
to causation); Heth, supra note 31, at 855 (noting difficulties involved in proving
causation).
51 See O'Toole, supra note 2, at 188 (noting difficulty prosecutors face in attempting to
prove that particular defendant was one who infected victim); Ruby, supra note 30, at 327
(noting that prosecutors must prove that "victim contracted the disease from the actions
of the defendant, and not from any other source").
52 See Robert 0. Boorstinc, Criminal and Civil Litigation on Spread of AIDS Appears,
N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1987, at Al (reporting case in New York where assault charges in
knowing transmission case were dropped because of "the difficulty of finding positive
medical evidence of transmission," and of case in Michigan where attempted murder
charges were thrown out in knowing transmission case because of lack of evidence of
transmitting virus through saliva); Donald E. Walther, Taming a Phoenix: The Year-and-
a-Day Rule in Federal Prosecutions for Murder, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 1337, 1351
(1992)(noting cases where charges have been dropped in knowing transmission cases
because of lack of medical evidence showing how HIV can be transmitted).
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crime.53 In some states, for instance, as long as the defendant
had the requisite mental state, whether or not the activity
actually transferred the virus to the victim is irrelevant. 54
In cases where the prosecution must make a showing that
transmission was possible, 55 a remote possibility of transmission
has been held sufficient. In Weeks v. State,56 the Texas Court of
Appeals affirmed a conviction for attempted murder after the
defendant spit on a prison guard.57 At the time of the offense,
Weeks had tested positive for the HIV virus.58
In the Weeks case, a number of qualified HIV experts 59
testified during the trial and disagreed over the possibility of
transmitting HIV through saliva. 60 The state's experts even
53 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01, cmt. 3(b) (Official Draft and Revised Comments
1985) (rejecting impossibility defense in most circumstances).
54 See, e.g., State v. Haines, 545 N.E.2d 834, 839 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (stating "lilt was
only necessary for the State to show that Haines did all that he believed necessary to
bring about an intended result, regardless of what was actually possible"); Zickefoose v.
State, 270 Ind. 618, 623 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979) (affirming attempted murder conviction
where defendant did all that he believed necessary to cause death); People v. Davis, 72
N.Y.2d 32, 37 (N.Y. 1988) (holding that legal impossibility does not negate intent element
for attempted or intentional acts).
55 See Gostin, supra note 7, at 1044 (citing statistics that in cases where sexual
intercourse was mode of transmission, likelihood of transmission based on one encounter
is relatively low -estimated at 1/1,000 or 1/10,000 if condom is used).
56 834 S.W.2d 559 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992).
57 See id. at 560. The statute under which Weeks was convicted states: "A person
commits an offense if, with specific intent to commit an offense, he does the act amounting
to more than mere preparation that tends but fails to effect the commission of the offense
intended." TEX. PENAL CODE § 15.01(a). Id.
58 See id. (noting that "[a]t the time of the offense, appellant had tested positive for
the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), the virus which causes acquired immune
deficiency syndrome (AIDS)").
59 See id. at 562. Four qualified experts on HIV testified at the trial. Id. Mark E.
Dowell, M.D. a doctor of infectious diseases at Baylor College of Medicine; Paul
Drummond Cameron, Ph.D., Chairman of the Family Research Institute; and Lorraine
Day, M.D., an orthopedic surgeon at the University of California at San Francisco and
Chief of the Orthopedic Department at San Francisco General Hospital, were called to
testify for the State. Id. Dr. Richard B. Pollard, Professor of Internal Medicine and
Microbiology at the University of Texas Medical Branch at Galveston and Director of the
Diagnostic Virology Laboratory at the University of Texas, testified on behalf of Curtis
Weeks. Id.
60 See id. at 562 n.2. (noting that "[m]any of the AIDS experts express the opinion
that it is impossible to transmit HIV through saliva"); see also Wayne R. Coyne, An
Economic Analysis Of The Issues Surrounding AIDS In The Long Run, The Path of Truth
and Reason Cannot Be Diverted, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 1199, 1207 (1992) (stating that most
scientists believe transmission of HIV through saliva is nonexistent); Gostin, supra note
7, at 1023-25 (noting "there has never been a documented case of transmission by saliva,
despite close observation and follow-up investigations of cases of biting, spitting, deep
kissing, and intimate caring activities"); Alan R. Lifson, Do Alternative Modes for
Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus Exist? A Review, 259 J. AM. MED.
ASSOC. 1353, 1354 (1988) (noting that given present data, risk of transmitting HIV
through saliva is still only "theoretical" or "negligible"). But see John T. Wolohan, An
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agreed that the possibility of transmission through saliva was
small.61 An amici curiae brief, jointly filed by The American Civil
Liberties Union, the Dallas Gay Alliance, the Texas Human
Rights Foundation, and the Greater Houston American Civil
Liberties Union,62 urged the Court of Appeals to take judicial
notice63 "that it is impossible to transmit the virus which causes
AIDS by spitting."64 The court refused, noting that such a
statement had never been conclusively proven.65
Proving causation becomes particularly troublesome when
prosecuting knowing transmission cases under traditional
assault statutes. 66 Under many states' assault statutes,6 7 it is
Ethical And Legal Dilemma: Participation In Sports By HIV Infected Athletes, 7 MARQ.
SPORTS L. J. 373, 397 n.31 (finding evidence that shows that contact with saliva results in
transmission of HIV).
61 See Weeks v. State, 834 S.W.2d 559, 562 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992). Mark E. Dowell,
M.D., one of the three HIV experts that testified for the State stated that "the possibility
[of transmission through saliva] is low but certainly not zero." Id. Dr. Dowell added that
the possibility would increase if there was blood in the saliva or if the saliva went up the
victim's nose or got on his or her lips. Id. But see Gerald H. Friedland & Robert S. Klein,
Transmission of the Human Immunodeficiency Virus, 317 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1125, 1133
(Oct. 29, 1987).
The accumulated data strongly support the conclusion that transmission of HIV
occurs only through blood, sexual activity, and perinatal events. Nevertheless, the
fear of transmission by other routes may continue to increase with the anticipated
increase in the number of cases of AIDS over the next few years. An unrealistic
requirement for absolute certainty about the lack of transmission by other routes
persists, despite the knowledge that it is not scientifically possible to prove that an
event cannot occur.
Id.
62 See Weeks, 834 S.W.2d at 562 n2.
63 See id. at 562 n.2, citing TEX. R. CRIM. EVID. § 201(b). § 201(b) states: "A judicially
noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is ... capable of
accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably
be questioned." Id.
64 See Weeks, 834 S.W.2d at 562 n.2.
65 See id. (noting that it has "not been conclusively established [that it is impossible
to transmit HIV through saliva] and is not free from reasonable dispute. Accordingly, this
court can not take judicial notice of the matter urged.").
66 See DEROHANNESIAN II, supra note 49, at 526 (noting that causation can be "major
issue" in prosecuting knowing transmission cases under many assault statutes). But c.f.
United States v. Joseph, 33 M.J. 960, 962-63 (C.M.A. 1991) (convicting defendant of
aggravated assault for having sexual intercourse with woman while knowing he was HIV-
positive).
67 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.10 (McKinney 1996). New York's statute for first degree
assault provides:
A person is guilty of assault in the first degree when:
1. With intent to cause serious physical injury to another person, he causes such
injury to such person or to a third person by means of a deadly weapon or a
dangerous instrument; or
3. Under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life, he recklessly
engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another person, and thereby
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often required that the defendant's act be likely to produce "great
bodily injury," "serious physical injury," or some similar level of
injury.68  The causation element opens traditional assault
statutes to attack by defendants who argue that their "acts" did
not cause "great bodily injury" or "serious physical injury."
One California appellate court set aside a defendant's
conviction based upon information that there was no "'rational'
basis for 'assuming the possibility' that petitioner's act was 'likely
to produce great bodily injury."' 69 In Guevara v. Superior Court,70
the defendant was arrested for having unprotected consensual
intercourse with a minor without disclosing his HIV-positive
status.71 The California appellate court examined the likelihood
that the defendant's acts would result in the transmission of
HIV72 and concluded that there was no evidence to support the
charge that his bodily fluids "'were likely to infect the minor with
HIV."'73 As the court in Guevara demonstrated, unless the victim
is actually infected by the defendant, issues of causation can
prove troublesome in attempting to prosecute knowing
transmission cases under traditional criminal laws.
III. HIV-SPECIFIC CRIMINALIZATION STATUTES FOR THE KNOWING
causes serious physical injury to another person; or
Id.
68 See DEROHANNES!AN HI, supra note 49, at 526 (stating that many assault statutes
require "the element that the act would be likely to produce 'great bodily injury,' 'serious
physical injury,' or similar level of injury").
69 See Guevara v. Superior Court, 62 Cal. App. 4th 864, 870 (Cal. App. 6th 1998)
(holding that "[tlhe record discloses no such 'rational' basis for the magistrate's implicit
assumption").
70 See id.
71 See id.
72 See id. at 869-70. The court cites two studies showing that infection rates through
sexual intercourse are relatively low. Id. Niclosi et al., The Efficiency of Male-To-Female
and Female-To-Male Sexual Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus: A Study of
730 Stable Couples, 5 EPIDEMIOLOGY 570, 572-73 (1994). In this study of over 200
uninfected female partners of infected males, less than 10 percent of the women became
infected during the four-year study period. Id.; Saracco et al., Man-To-Woman Sexual
Transmission of HIV: Longitudinal Study of 343 Steady Partners of Infected Men, 6 J.
ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROMES 497, 500 (1993). This study states that the
annual infection rate for female partners of unprotected infected males was 5.7 percent.
Id. See generally Norman Hearst & Stephanie B. Hulley, Preventing the Heterosexual
Spread of AIDS: Are We Giving Our Patients the Best Advice?, 259 J. AM. MED. ASSOC.
2428, 2429 (1988). The authors note a number of estimates regarding male-to-female
infection rates. Id.
73 Gueverra, 62 Cal. App. at 869.
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TRANSMISSION OF HIV
Current statistics show that the HIV-AIDS epidemic continues
to grow at an alarming rate. 74 Presently, New York State does
not have a statute that specifically targets the knowing
transmission of the HIV virus. 75 In the aftermath of the case
against Nushawn Williams, over 60 HIV-related bills have been
introduced in the New York State Legislature. 76 Two legislative
proposals are currently being debated in both the New York
State Senate77 and Assembly 78 that would permit prosecutors to
charge individuals with knowingly transmitting the HIV virus.
As drafted, the Senate79 and Assembly80 versions of the bill
would amend the penal law by adding two new sections. These
two new sections would be called: reckless endangerment of the
public health in the first degree and reckless endangerment of
the public health in the second degree.8 1 Such an offense, if
74 See San Francisco AIDS Foundation: About AIDS (last modified Dec. 31, 1998)
<<http:lwww.sfaf.org/abouaids/statistics/>>. It is estimated that there are between
650,000-900,000 HIV-positive individuals in the United States. Id. As of December 31,
1998, there has been a total of 641,086 reported AIDS cases in this country alone. Id.
Approximately one in every 300 Americans is estimated to be HIV-positive. Id.
Additionally, it is estimated that there are at least 40,000 new infections per year. Id.
Statistics from: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, HIV/AIDS Surveillance
Report, Cases Reported through December 1997; see also SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT TO
THE AMERICAN PUBLIC ON HIV INFECTION AND AIDS, 1 (1993), reprinted in Gabel, supra
note 18, at 981. AIDS has now become the third leading cause of death among men and
women between the ages of twenty-five and forty-four in this country. Id.
75 See Hansen, supra note 10, at 26 (noting that "New York state has no law
specifically targeting transmission of the virus that causes AIDS- .. ").
76 See Lynda Richardson, Man Faces Felony Charge of Exposing Girl to HIV, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 20, 1998, at B3 (noting that in 1998, about 60 HIV-related bills were
introduced before legislature). See, e.g., NY S.B. 6076, 221st Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. (N.Y.
1997)(attempting to amend penal law by adding new section 125.11 of criminally
negligent homicide by person with HIV); NY A.B. 9434, 221st Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. (N.Y.
1997)(attempting to amend penal law section 125.25, by adding knowing transmission as
crime of murder in second degree).
77 See S.B. 3017, supra note 8.
78 See A.B. 5501, supra note 8.
79 See S.B. 3017, supra note 8.
80 See A.B. 5501, supra note 8.
81 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.05(3). § 15.05(3) defines the level of culpability necessary
with respect to a crime where the required culpability is recklessness:
A person acts recklessly with respect to a result or to a circumstance described by a
statute defining an offense when he is aware of and consciously disregards a
substantial and unjustifiable risk that such result will occur or that such
circumstance exists. The risk must be of such nature and degree that disregard
thereof constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable
person would observe in the situation ...
Id.
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committed in the first degree, would constitute a class B felony,
and if in the second degree, a class C felony.8 2 Both proposals
require that the defendant be "aware" that he or she is HIV-
positive when engaging in the prohibited conduct.8 3
Additionally, the Senate8 4 and Assembly 85 bills would amend
the criminal procedure law and require the testing of any
individual arrested for violating the knowing transmission
statute. 86 The statute provides that the results of these tests be
made available to the victim upon request.8 7 Courts in New York
State have held, in other criminal proceedings, that the results of
court-ordered blood tests could be disclosed to the district
attorney's office for criminal adjudication. 88
Amidst growing concerns surrounding the intentional
transmission of HIV, states across the country have passed laws
designed to protect the public from the spread of HIV-AIDS.89
Presently, over one-half of the states have criminalized the
knowing transmission or exposure of another to the HIV virus. 90
In addition to state legislation, a recent proposal in Congress, the
82 See S.B. 3017, supra note 8; A.B. 5501, supra note 8.
83 See S.B. 3017, supra note 8; A.B. 5501, supra note 8.
84 See S.B. 3017, supra note 8.
85 See A.B. 5501, supra note 8.
86 See S.B. 3017, supra note 8; A.B. 5501, supra note 8. Each proposal would amend
the criminal procedure law as follows:
Section 160.46 HIV [Related Testing Of Alleged Sex And Public Health Offenders]
1. A police officer who makes an arrest for any crime set forth in... Section
120.26... of the penal law ... shall following such arrest.., cause such defendant to
be immediately given an HIV related test to determine if such defendant has HIV
infection, HIV related illness or AIDS.
3. The result of an HIV related test performed pursuant to subdivision one of this
section, shall, upon request, be made available to the victim or alleged victim of such
crime and to the defendant.
Id.
Cf. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 775.0877 (1) (West 1995). The Florida statute bars the state from
using the results of the test in a prosecution in which the test was ordered for. Id.
87 See S.B. 3017, supra note 8; A.B. 5501, supra note 8.
88 See In the Matter of Abe A., 56 N.Y.2d 288, 291 (N.Y. 1982) (holding that suspect in
criminal investigation may be required by court order to give sample of blood for scientific
analysis); People v. Anonymous, 153 Misc. 2d 436, 438 (Monroe Cty. Ct. 1992) (holding
disclosure of HIV test results to court was necessary because of "clear and imminent
danger" to health of those who might come in contact with defendant).
89 See Hansen, supra note 10, at 26 (discussing growth of knowing transmission
statutes); Richardson, supra note 4, at Al (discussing number of states adopting knowing
transmission statutes).
90 See Richardson, supra note 4, at Al (noting that over 30 states had some form of
statute criminalizing knowing transmission of HIV).
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"HIV Prevention Act of 1997,"91 would incorporate many of the
provisions already enacted by the states.92 Both the House93 and
Senate94 versions of the act would require case reporting95 and
notification to those who may have been exposed to the virus.96
The proposals also state Congressional desire for states to have
their own HIV-specific knowing transmission statutes in effect.97
Legislation aimed at restricting the actions of HIV-positive
individuals reflects an overall trend in the criminal justice
system's response to the HIV-AIDS crisis. Legislative goals have
shifted the focus from protecting the civil liberties of HIV-positive
individuals to prosecuting those who attempt to knowingly
transmit the virus.98 AIDS activists argue that HIV-specific
criminalization statutes, similar to the ones currently being
debated in New York99 and Congress,lOO are an attempt to
politicize a public health issue.101 These activists contend that
91 See HIV Prevention Act of 1997, H.R. 1062, 105th Cong. (1997); HIV Prevention
Act of 1997, S. 503, 105th Cong. (1997).
92 See H.R. 1062, supra note 91. The House version, with 111 Cosponsors (3
Democrats and 108 Republicans) would amend title XIX of the Social Security Act in
order to help prevent the transmission of the HIV virus. Id.; see also S. 503, supra note 91.
The Senate version, with 5 Cosponsors (all Republicans) is offered as a bill to prevent the
transmission of HIV. Id. Both versions have yet to make it through a legislative session;
see also Hansen, supra note 10, at 26. The author explains that three categories of
legislation adopted by states would be incorporated into federal legislation: case
reporting, partner notification, and increased penalties for HIV-positive persons who
knowingly infect others without disclosing their HIV status. Id.
93 See H.R. 1062, supra note 91.
94 See S. 503, supra note 91.
95 See H.R. 1062, supra note 91, at § 3; S. 503, supra note 91, at § 3. Both the House
and Senate versions provide: "The State requires that, in the case of a health professional
or other entity that provides for the performance of a test for HIV on an individual, the
entity confidentially report positive test results to the State public health officer..." Id.
96 See H.R. 1062, supra note 91, at § 3; S. 503, supra note 91, at § 3. Both the House
and Senate versions provide: "The State requires that the public health officer of the State
carry out a program of partner notification to inform individuals that the individuals may
have been exposed to HIV." Id.
97 See H.R. 1062, supra note 91, at §4; S. 503, supra note 91, at § 4. Both the House
and Senate versions provide: "It is the sense of the Congress that the States should have
in effect laws providing that, in the case of an individual who knows that he or she has
HIV disease, it is a felony for the individual to infect another with HIV if the individual
engages in the behaviors involved with the intent of so infecting the other individual." Id.
98 See Richardson, supra note 4, at Al (stating that focus is now on public welfare);
Argetsinger, supra note 42, at (noting Georgetown University Law professor Lawrence
Gostin's statement that trend of AIDS cases in 1990s "is to be quite punitive against
persons with AIDS").
99 See S.B. 3017, supra note 8; A.B. 5501, supra note 8.
100 See H.R. 1062, supra note 92; S. 503, supra note 92.
101 See Hansen, supra note 10, at 26. The author notes claims by AIDS activists' that
while 27 states have increased the penalties for HIV-infected persons, those penalties are
not usually enforced. Id. See generally Gabel, supra note 18, at 982. The author argues
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such statutes are merely symptomatic of a public misconception
about the virus1 02 and "reflect[s] a misguided and politically
motivated eagerness to be seen as doing something to combat the
spread of AIDS."103
Critics of HIV-specific criminal statutes also argue that
education is the most important tool in curtailing the spread of
the HIV virus. 104 While these statutes will arguably make it
easier to prosecute individuals like Nushawn Williams,105 critics
that "[t]he purpose of this Comment is to assess those recalcitrant cases and the
associated charges under which [these knowing transmission] convictions occur. The
dignity of individuals who are HIV-positive or suffering from AIDS should not be
maligned by the actions of a few who exceed the normal parameters of human decency."
Id.
102 See Richardson, supra note 76, at B4. Opponents cite recent statistics that state in
1997, 55% of Americans believed that they could become infected by sharing a drinking
glass with an infected person, compared with 48% in 1991. Id. Additionally, 41% believed
that AIDS could be contracted from a public toilet, compared with 34% in 1991. Id. See
also Lee Sanchez, Stephanie Wilson, Lisa Speissegger & Amanda Watson, Criminal
Transmission and Exposure (July 19, 1999) <<http://stateserv.hpts.org/public/issueb.n.>>.
The authors note a 1997 poll showing that 79% of Americans believe that an individual
who knowingly infects another with HIV should face murder charges. Id.
103 See Boorstinc, supra note 52 (reporting that public health specialists and gay
rights advocates argue that "politicians have seized on a handful of peculiar and frivolous
cases and have often relied on faulty medical assumptions to justify their call for
legislation."); see also Gostin, supra note 7, at 1043 (arguing that many prosecutions of
knowing transmission cases "reflect either a politically motivated eagerness to be seen to
be combating [sic] AIDS or a misunderstanding of how it is transmitted"); Ruby, supra
note 30, at 318 (noting argument by critics that knowing transmission statutes are
politically motivated); Strader, supra note 20, at 438 (noting argument that politics has
played important role in recent passage of HIV transmission statutes); see generally Scott
A. McCabe, The Maryland Survey: 1995-1996: Recent Decisions: The Maryland Court of
Appeals, 56 MD. L. REV. 762, 775 (1997) (arguing that prosecuting knowing transmission
of AIDS is not best way to safeguard public health).
104 See Richard T. Andrias, Urban Criminal Justice: Has the Response to the HIV
Epidemic Been 'TFair"?, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 497, 506 (1993) (stating consensus that
best way of combating AIDS epidemic "is to stress education, voluntary testing and
counseling'); Martha A. Field & Kathleen M. Sullivan, AIDS and the Criminal Law, 15
LAw, MED. & HEALTH CARE 46, 47 (1987) (arguing that "public education about AIDS
prevention is a far preferable means of influencing behavior"); Gabel, supra note 18, at
987 (noting importance of educating individuals regarding "abstinence, monogamy and
the proper use of condoms."); Lawrence 0. Gostin, The Future of Public Health Law, 12
AM. J.L. & MED. 461, 464 (1986) (advocating educating those in high risk groups about
transmission dangers); see also UNITED STATES CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY
ASSESSMENT, How EFFECTIVE IS AIDS EDUCATION? 1 (June 1988)(noting that public
officials stress education as primary means to helping stop spread of AIDS by high-risk
individuals).
105 See Colloquy, supra note 1, at 936 (arguing that HIV-specific statutes provide
opportunities for successful state prosecutions "without all the problems that are raised
by traditional offenses that have specific intent or purpose requirements and that require
establishing causation"); Mona Markus, A Treatment for the Disease: Criminal HiV
Transmission/Exposure Laws, 23 NOVA L. REV. 847, 850 (1999) (stating that HIV-specific
criminalization statutes are "far more effective" than traditional criminal laws in
prosecuting knowing transmission cases). But see Ruby, supra note 30, at 325 (arguing
that use of existing criminal statutes is more effective in prosecuting knowing
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contend that such laws will ultimately have detrimental effects
on the fight against the virus.106 It is argued that those who are
infected will be less likely to go for tests107 and less willing to get
treatment.108 In response, proponents of federal legislation aimed
at criminalizing the knowing transmission of HIV argue that the
threat from HIV-AIDS has reached such epidemic proportions
that it must be treated as a significant threat to public health. 109
transmission cases).
106 See McCabe, supra note 103, at 775 (arguing that passage of knowing
transmission statutes would be "expensive, ineffective, and counterproductive").
107 See, e.g., Renee Cordes, Prosecuting HIV Cases - Solution of Problem?, 28 TRIAL
92, 92-93 (Feb. 1992) (noting that according to director of U.S. AIDS Litigation Project at
U.S. Public Health Service, Lawrence Gostin, criminal prosecutions may "discourage
people from having the appropriate tests to determine whether or not they test HIV-
positive... if it's a felony to have sex knowing you're infected, then you simply won't want
to know you're infected"); O'Toole, supra note 2, at 201 (noting that knowing transmission
statutes, and forced disclosure of testing that many of these statutes require, "could
discourage testing and ultimately even prove to be counter-productive in containing the
spread of HIV"); Hansen, supra note 10, at 28 (citing director of ACLU's AIDS project
Matt Coles' statement that research shows that many people have claimed they will not
undergo testing for AIDS if legislation that requires reporting also requires the names of
HIV-infected persons to be sent to the government); David Sharrock, Clarke Rejects Law
on AIDS Transmission, THE GUARDIAN, December 16, 1992, at 2 (noting that HIV-specific
statutes may lead to decrease in AIDS testing).
108 See, e.g., Scott Burris, Law and the Social Risk of Health Care: Lessons from HIV
Testing, 61 ALB. L. REV. 831, 841 (1998) (stating that U.S. response to AIDS epidemic led
to conclusion that "an appropriate legal response to HIV-AIDS will most often have as its
desired outcome the absence, rather than the presence of applicable law"); David, supra
note 30, at 260 (1995) (noting that some public health officials are concerned that
prosecuting knowing transmission cases may "be counter-productive to public health
initiatives); Lawrence 0. Gostin, Public Health Strategies for Confronting AIDS, 261 J.
AM. MED. Assoc. 1621, 1629 (1989) (stating that such legislation proceeds despite lack of
evidence of its effectiveness and contradicts numerous health officials' advice); Lawrence
0. Gostin, The Case Against Compulsory Casefinding in Controlling AIDS, 12 AM. J. L.
MED. 7, 24 (1987) (claiming involuntary, highly restrictive measures may deter
cooperation with health officials and programs, and that there is no direct correlation
between intrusiveness of legislation and effectiveness of laws).
109 See Hansen, supra note 10, at 26 (quoting Representative Tom Coburn, practicing
family doctor and chief sponsor of HIV-partner notification bill, "it's time to stop treating
AIDS like a civil rights issue and start treating it like the public health crisis that it is");
Richardson, supra note 4, at Al (noting that Representative Gary L. Ackerman, co-
sponsor of Federal HIV-partner notification bill with Representative Tom Coburn, argued
that "we have to get over the hurdle of treating AIDS as if it were a political disease
rather than a public health disease"); see also HIV Transmission: Hearing on the Health &
Environment Subcommittee of the House Commerce Committee, 105th Cong. 1062 (1998)
(statement of Charlie Norwood, Representative, Georgia) (stating that "HIV is a public
health problem first. And secondly, a civil rights issue"); HIV Transmission: Hearing on
the Health & Environment Subcommittee of the House Commerce Committee, 105th Cong.
1062 (1998) (statement of Robert Berke, M.D., Commissioner of Public Health,
Chautauqua County Health Department) (stating that while HIV needs to be treated as
communicable disease "[i]t suffices to say that there is a clear and present danger that the
public health efforts to control HIV may be put at some risk if there is a perceived close
connection between the public health and criminal action efforts").
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IV. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO THE PROSECUTION OF
KNOWING TRANSMISSION CASES
Knowing transmission statutes have been challenged on
various constitutional grounds. Most frequently, challengers
have argued that such statutes are either unconstitutionally
vaguellO or overbroad. 11 In order to minimize the number of
constitutional challenges to knowing transmission statutes states
should specifically define what behavior falls within its statutory
provisions and set forth examples of actions subject to criminal
prosecution. 112
The United States Supreme Court has held that laws must be
sufficiently defined to: (1) give those of ordinary intelligence
reasonable opportunity to know what is being prohibited; and (2)
provide explicit standards to those who are to apply these
laws. 113 In challenging knowing transmission statutes, opponents
110 See People v. Russell, 158 Ill.2d 23, 27 (Ill. 1994) (finding an HIV-specific criminal
statute to be "sufficiently clear and explicit so that a person of ordinary intelligence need
not have to guess at its meaning or application"); People v. Dempsey, 242 Ill. App.3d 568,
591 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (explaining that in order to successfully challenge statute as
unconstitutionally vague, it must be vague as applied to defendant's conduct); State v.
Gamberella, 633 So.2d 595, 601-03 (La. App. 1993) (dismissing various vagueness
arguments posed by defendant); State v. Stark, 832 P.2d 109, 115 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992)
(indicating that since HIV-specific criminal statute does not involve any First Amendment
rights, defendant may only argue that it is vague as applied to him).
111 See People v. Jensen, 231 Mich. App. 439, 442 (1998) (holding that defendant's
challenge of Michigan's knowing transmission statute as overbroad failed).
112 See REPORT, supra note 1, at 131. In 1987, a Presidential Commission was
established to investigate the spread of the HIV-AIDS virus in the United States. Id. The
Commission recommended that "[a]doption by the states of a criminal statute-directed to
those HIV-infected individuals who know of their status and engage in behaviors which
they know are, according to scientific research, likely to result in transmission of HIV-
[should] clearly set forth those specific behaviors subject to criminal sanctions." Id; see
also O'Toole, supra note 2, at 192. The author notes that in response to the Presidential
Commission "many of the states have meticulously and effectively defined exactly what
behavior is encompassed by the terms used in their HIV-specific crime statutes. But see
S.B. 3017, supra note 8; A.B. 5501, supra note 8.
113 See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972). The Supreme Court
upheld the unconstitutionality of "vague" statutes because such statutes deprived
defendant of his or her due process rights. Justice Marshall stated:
Vague laws offend several important values. First, because we assume that man is
free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the person
of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that
he may act accordingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair
warning. Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws
must provide explicit standards for those who apply them. A vague law impermissibly
delegates the basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an
ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and
discriminatory application."
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have argued that the statutes are so vague or overbroad that
they could prohibit conduct that is unable or unlikely to transmit
the HIV virus. 114 Critics contend that this vagueness and
overbreadth is a result of the legislature's dissatisfaction with
attempts to prosecute knowing transmission cases under
traditional criminal laws. 115 Despite criticism, many states'
highest courts have upheld knowing transmission statutes
against constitutional challenges.l1 6
For example, a trial court in Illinois struck down the states'
knowing transmission statute as unconstitutionally vague. 117
Two years later, however, Illinois' highest court upheld the
statute as constitutional in People v. Russell.118  Russell
challenged the Illinois statute, which prohibited the knowing
Otransmission of HIV to another through "intimate contact."1 1 9
Russell argued that the statute was "so vague as to deny the
defendants due process of law."120 The Illinois Supreme Court
found that the defendants brief failed to show how the Illinois
statute violated either the federal or state constitution. 121
Instead, the court held the statute was "sufficiently clear and
Id.
114 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 39-608 (Supp. 1991) (prohibiting transfer or attempt to
transfer any bodily fluid, including saliva); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720 § 5/12-16.2 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1993) (prohibiting exposure of bodily fluid of one to another in manner that
could result in infection); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-18-112 (1989) (proscribing knowingly
exposing another to infection, but not providing any definitional terms); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 9A.36.021 (West Supp. 1991) (providing that it is illegal to administer or cause
HIV to be taken by another person); see also Leech, supra note 35, at 687 (noting that
individuals have been convicted for conduct that did not transmit HIV).
115 See Colloquy, supra note 1, at 941 (noting that HIV-specific statutes are in
response to "dissatisfaction" with attempting to fit knowing transmission prosecutions
under traditional criminal laws).
116 See People v. Russell, 158 Ill.2d 23, 25 (II1. 1994) (reversing two lower court
decisions that declared state's criminal transmission of HIV statute to be
unconstitutionally vague); State v. Gamberella, 633 So.2d 595, 602 (La. App. 1993)
(upholding state's statute criminalizing intentional exposure of AIDS virus against claims
that intent element of statute was "uncertain" and exposure element "unclear"); People v.
Jensen, 231 Mich. App. 439, 442 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998) (upholding constitutionality of
Michigan's knowing transmission statute).
117 See People v. Russell, No. 91-CF-1304 (St. Clair Co. April 9, 1992) (charging
defendant with engaging in consensual sexual intercourse without notifying her partner
of her HIV-positive status); People v. Lunsford, No. 92-CF-147 (Coles Co. Oct. 9, 1992)
(charging defendant with raping woman knowing that he was HIV-positive).
118 158 Ill.2d 23, 25-26 (Ill. 1994) (holding that statute did not violate free speech,
free association, and was not unconstitutionally vague).
119 See id. at 25.
120 See id.
121 See id.
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explicit so that a person of ordinary intelligence need not have to
guess at its meaning or application."122
In People v. Jensen,123  Michigan's knowing transmission
statute124 was challenged on grounds of overbreadth. The
defendant asserted that the statute was unconstitutionally
overbroad because it criminalized both consensual and
nonconsensual acts. 125 The Michigan Court of Appeals, in
upholding the statute, looked to the Illinois Supreme Court
decision in People v. Russelll26 for guidance. The Michigan court
held that the defendant's conduct was clearly within the scope of
the statutel 27  because the defendant engaged in sexual
intercourse with the victim while failing to warn him of her HIV-
positive status. 128 Therefore the defendant could not merit a
claim of overbreadth. 129
122 See id. at 27. The Illinois statute provides in pertinent part:
Criminal Transmission of HIV. (a) A person commits criminal transmission of H1V
when he or she, knowing that he or she is infected with HIV:
(1) engages in intimate contact with another;
(b) For purposes of this Section:
'Intimate contact with another' means the exposure of the body of one person to a
bodily fluid of another person in a manner that could result in the transmission of
HIV.
123 See People v. Jensen, 231 Mich. App. 439 (1998).
124 See MCL §333.5210; MSA 14.15(5210) states as follows:
(1) A person who knows that he or she has or has been diagnosed as having acquired
immunodeficiency syndrome or acquired immunodeficiency syndrome related
complex, or who knows that he or she is HIV infected, and who engages in sexual
penetration with another person without having first informed the other person that
he or she has acquired immunodeficiency syndrome or acquired immunodeficiency
syndrome related complex or is HIV infected, is guilty of a felony.
(2) As used in this section, "sexual penetration" means sexual intercourse,
cunnilingus, fellatio, anal intercourse, or any other intrusion, however slight, of any
part of a person's body or of any object into the genital or anal openings of another
person's body, but emission of semen is not required.
Id.
125 See Jensen, 231 Mich. App. at 446. The defendant had argued that the statute
"seemingly also compels victims of nonconsensual sex who happen to be HIV or AIDS
carriers to inform their attackers of that status." Id. In addition, the defendant argued
that the statute was unconstitutional because it failed to provide for intent to cause harm.
Id. at 447.
126 158 Ill. 2d 23 (1994).
127 See Jensen, 231 Mich. App. at 447 (stating that "defendant's conduct, i.e.,
engaging in sexual intercourse with the victim without previously telling him that she
was HIV positive is clearly encompassed by the statute's language").
128 Id. at 446. The court described the defendant's conduct as "engaging in sexual
intercourse with the victim without informing him beforehand that she was HIV-
positive." Id.
129 Id. at 447 (holding "[blecause a person to whom a statute may constitutionally be
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Some states have recognized consent as an affirmative defense
to a prosecution under knowing transmission statutes.130 Where
the person exposed knew that the defendant was HIV-positive,
but still engaged in sexual relations, this knowledge and consent
would negate the intent element of the crime of knowing
transmission. 131 In a majority of the states, however, knowing
transmission statutes do not provide such a defense.132 Even
where consent has been presented as a trial issue, some courts
have disregarded such a defense in cases where the intention to
infect was so egregious. 133 Proponents of a consent defense
provision argue that a notification defense would encourage those
infected to disclose their HIV status to their partners. 134
applied will not be allowed to challenge that statute on the ground that it conceivably may
be applied unconstitutionally to others in situations not before the court, (internal
citations omitted) we find no merit in defendant's overbreadth claim").
130 See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720, para. 5/12-16.2(d) (Smith-Hurd 1993) (stating that
consent was defense if "the person exposed knew that the infected person was infected
with HIV, knew that the action could result in an infection with HIV, and consented to
the action with that knowledge"); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 14-384.24 (West 1993) (providing for
defense of consent if person is "informed of the presence of the sexually transmitted
disease and [consents] to sexual intercourse"); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-123(b) (Michie
Supp. 1992) (stating that "person commits the offense ... without first having informed
the other person of the presence of HIV"); IDAHO CODE § 39-608 (1992) (authorizing that
"[ilt shall be an affirmative defense that the sexual activity took place between consenting
adults after full disclosure.., of the risk"); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:43.5(A) (West 1993)
(providing "[n]o person shall ... without the knowing and lawful consent of the victim");
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-60 (Michie Supp. 1992) (prohibiting any HIV infected person from
"knowingly" engaging in sexual intercourse without disclosing their infection to his or her
partner); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-109(c) (1998) (establishing victim's knowledge that
defendant was infected with HIV as affirmative defense).
131 Interestingly, the affirmative defense of consent has arisen most often in military
prosecutions against servicemen. See e.g., United States v. Morris, 30 M.J. 1221 (1990).
The court rejected the defendant's claim that consent was a defense where his partner
was aware of defendant's HIV-positive status while consenting to unprotected sexual
intercourse. Id. United States v. Dumford, 28 M.J. 836 (1989). The court rejected an
airman's claim that his partner's consent to sexual relations, when defendant failed to
inform her of his HIV-positive status, was a defense. Id. United States v. Johnson, 27 M.J.
798 (1988). The court held that consent was not a defense to charges of aggravated
assault in sexual encounter between teenager and HIV-positive air force sergeant. Id.
United States v. Woods, 27 M.J. 749 (1988). The court upheld a serviceman's conviction
despite the prosecutor's failure to allege that the defendant did not inform his partner of
his HIV-positive status. Id.
132 See Colloquy, supra note 1, at 945 (noting that consent as defense is only
applicable in minority of states).
133 See e.g., United States v. Johnson, 27 M.J. 798 (1988); United States v. Morris, 30
M.J. 1221 (1990).
134 See, e.g., MICHAEL L. CLOSEN ET AL., AIDS: CASES AND MATERIALS 712 (1989)
(noting that consent defense may promote testing).
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V. SOLUTION
The rise in the number of HIV-specific criminalization statutes
may be directly related to the pressures of the political
process. 135 Legislators have responded to a number of high-
profile cases, 136 which have caused a public outrage over the
reprehensible acts of a few individuals. Regardless of the reason
behind the enactment of knowing transmission statutes, these
laws have been widely accepted as a means of combating the
spread of the HIV-AIDS virus. 137
Despite this acceptance by the public, defendants have
consistently challenged the constitutionally of these statutes on
grounds of vagueness and overbreadth. Additionally, opponents
criticize that these statutes will have a detrimental effect in
stopping the spread of AIDS.138 In the face of these challenges,
135 See e.g., Gostin, supra note 108, at 1629 (stating that "[plolitical pressures" have
been behind recent trends in adopting HIV-specific statutes); Gostin, supra note 7, at
1052-57 (arguing against HIV-specific penal statutes); Kathleen M Sullivan & Martha
Field, AIDS and the Coercive Power of the State, 23 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 139, 162-72
(1988) (discussing knowing transmission statutes).
136 See, e.g., Brazier, supra note 3, at F19 (describing local case where HIV-positive
man, whom the author describes as "a murderer in disguise," knowingly transmitted virus
through sexual intercourse to at least four women); Gostin, supra note 3, at Part II, 5
(describing case where defendant was charged with attempted murder for selling his HIV-
infected blood to area blood bank); Pristin, supra note 3, at M3 (describing charges of
attempted murder against defendant for knowingly attempting to transmit HIV to
another man through unprotected sex); Reed, supra note 3, at B1 (reporting that Los
Angeles man was prosecuted for having sex with woman on number of occasions without
disclosing his HIV-positive status to her, resulting in infection of both her and child);
Robertson, supra note 3, at 1 (describing case where woman knowingly infected her
former boyfriend with HIV virus); Man Gets 9-Year Prison Term, supra note 3, at M5
(reporting 65 month prison sentence handed down to HIV-positive individual for
attempted murder after he knowingly exposed the HIV virus to seventeen-year-old girl
through sexual intercourse).
137 See REPORT, supra note 1, at 130 (1988). The Report noted that the establishment
of criminal penalties for HIV-positive individuals engaging in high-risk behaviors will
deter the individuals and protect society. Id. Colloquy, supra note 1, at 933.
Commentators suggest that criminalizing this conduct would lead to a decline in such. Id.
However, the possibility is recognized that criminalization might simply lead to more
secrecy regarding one's HIV status. Id. Markus, supra note 105, at 871. The author notes
that HIV transmission / exposure statutes "are preferable in that they make prosecution
easier and more successful .... Id.
138 See, e.g., Cordes, supra note 107, at 92-93 (noting that criminal prosecutions may
have detrimental effect on fight against AIDS); David, supra note 30, at 260 (1995)(noting
concerns that prosecuting knowing transmission cases may not be effective means of
stopping spread of AIDS); Gostin, supra note 7, at 1052-57 (arguing against strict penal
statutes in attempt to stop spread of AIDS); Hansen, supra note 10, at 28 (noting that
knowing transmission statutes may discourage individuals from getting tested); McCabe,
supra note 103, at 775 (arguing that passage of knowing transmission statutes would not
be effective in stopping spread of AIDS); O'Toole, supra note 2, at 186, 207 (noting that
knowing transmission statutes may not be effective in stopping the spread of AIDS);
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narrowly-worded, knowing transmission statutes should be
enacted in every state.
In drafting knowing transmission statutes, state legislatures
should enumerate specific activities known to transmit the HIV
virus and which fall within the prohibitions of that statute.
Many criminalization statutes as presently drafted include any
number of activities that pose little or no risk at all.139
Criminalization statutes should specifically define the intent
necessary to be prosecuted under these statutes, in order to
address the difficulties in proving intent in such cases. A
carefully drafted knowing transmission statute would punish
those who are in fact culpable and give notice to the public of the
activities that would subject individuals to prosecution under
HIV-specific legislation.
CONCLUSION
While the sort of effect HIV-specific transmission statutes have
in slowing the overall spread of AIDS is debatable, the desire to
punish and deter an arguably reprehensible act, namely,
knowingly transmitting the HIV virus to another, has been
widely accepted. New York should follow the lead of many other
jurisdictions throughout the country and adopt an HIV-specific
knowing transmission statute. Any adoption of an HIV-specific
knowing transmission statute in New York, however, must be
viewed as only part of an overall effort to stop the spread of the
HIV-AIDS virus. A carefully drafted knowing transmission
statute will aid in helping slow the spread of the HIV-AIDS virus
by punishing those who commit these reprehensible acts and who
are in fact culpable.
David Kromm
Sharrock, supra note 107, at 2 (noting that HIV-specific statutes may lead to decrease in
AIDS testing).
139 See Ruby, supra note 30, at 323 (noting that many HIV-specific statutes as
written can create "unintended defendants" because of their failure "to exempt specific
behaviors or actors"). See generally Pamela Martineau, Assembly Panel Approves Bill
Making Deliberate Transmission of HIV a Felony, METROPOLITAN NEWS-ENTERPRISE,
March 13, 1996, at 11 (noting debate in California whether statute would apply to
pregnant women who pass HIV to their children).
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